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This paper gives an overview of how war theories in Christianity changed during the
different periods of western Christianity from the late antiquity to modern times. The
basic thesis is that, in contrast to the relationship betweenwar and cult in ancient religions
of the old Orient, Greece, and Rome, Christian war theories had not only one, but two
functions to fulfill. On the one hand, the Christian religion had to cope with the in-
heritance of their traditional role models: priests and prophets had to support military
force and to secure the victory by divine aid.Bellum iustum in this sense was the cult that
pleased the Goddesses/God and ensured their/his backing. On the other hand, bellum
iustum in early Christian theology, and ever since, was a problem of peace, restriction of
power, and ethically-based self control. After the conversion of Constantine to Chris-
tianity, Christian emperors, kings, and princes were inclined to emphasize the first target
of Christian religion, while the theologians still had to interpret the moral restrictions on
warfare devised by St Augustine, St Thomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria, and the
philosophers of the Early modern international law. These competing expectations
concerning the relationship of Christianity and warfare led to many ambiguities, all too
often precluding a substantial contribution ofChristian religion to amore peaceful world.
Christianity in Late antiquity,Medieval, Earlymodern andModern times, StAugustin, St
Thomas Aquinas, Old Testament, Sermon on the Mount, Constantine, bellum iustum,
ethics of peace, crusades, war against heresy, confessionalism, juridification, and na-
tionalization of war
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1. War Cult and Peace Ethic: The Ambivalent Relationship
between Christianity and War
Nowadays, at the beginning of the 21stCentury, the horizon to discuss the problem
of religion and war has completely changed.1 The end of the cold war, 9/11, the
fear of Islamist terror in Europe!s great cities, and the ideological inhumanity of
the IS-regime in Iraq and Syria raked the anxiety conjoined to the notion of a
"clash of civilisations!. From the 1970s till 1989, the peace movements in Europe
and America requested the contribution of religion, especially Christianity, to
overcome the conflict of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, claiming nuclear dis-
armament and remonstrating military stockpile. Since then, the idea of religion in
this function being a source of violent fundamentalism has gained increasing
approval. Many adherents to western culture receive the impression that mono-
theism in itself – be it Christian, Muslim or Jewish – is densely connected to the
legitimation of war and terror. Therefore, the history of religious wars in Chris-
tianity up toGeorgeBush!s “war on terror” is read and interpreted as a variant but
corresponding version of modern Islamist radicalization.
But war theories circulating in the Christian tradition and in Christianity today
are in no way limited to predominantly religiously motivated military conflicts
that are identified with the concepts “religious war” or even “holy war.” Instead,
these theories are concerned in general with Christian religion in all forms and
types of war,2 as it has informed the West!s long and violent military history. The
predominantly legitimizing function of Christianity in war is agreed upon by
historically interested contemporaries: Ministers and pastors bless the weapons
and declare the war goals of attackers or defenders as right and good. Fur-
thermore, they express God!s partisanship textually and ritually and promote the
continuation of this or that outbreak of the next war as political practice with
military means.
However, a religious-historical comparison with pre-Christian and non-
Christian religions reveals the narrowness of such common preconceptions, be-
causeChristianity had to carry ambivalence into its confrontationswith the reality
of war. Both in the cultures of the ancient Orient and in Greek-Roman realms of
power, the cult of religious war remained intimately connected with political
1 This contribution is only a short, nearly irresponsibly simplifying summary, based
on: Holzem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum. Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der
Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte, Vol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009.
Annotations are reduced to direct quotations and references. For deeper insights in
sources, literature, special debates etc. refer to the manifold contributions to this book.
2 Cf. Beyrau, Dietrich / Hochgeschwender, Michael / Langewiesche, Dieter (eds.):
Formen des Krieges: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Krieg in der Geschichte,
Bd. 37), Paderborn et al. 2007.
22
Andreas Holzem
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
Holzem, Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 6, 21-37, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.1.21
In
te
rd
isc
ip
lin
ar
y 
Jo
ur
na
l f
or
 R
el
ig
io
n 
an
d 
Tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n 
in
 C
on
te
m
po
ra
ry
 S
oc
ie
ty
 –
 J-
Ra
T 
do
w
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.v
r-e
lib
ra
ry
.d
e 
by
 1
31
.1
30
.7
4.
71
 o
n 
Ju
ly
, 2
5 
20
18
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
authority and military control.3 Due to Christianity having aligned itself with the
narrative of the people of Israel and the early Judaic tradition in theHebrewbible,
and as this history of Israel cannot be isolated from, butmust rather be considered
in relation to the history of the people and empire building in the ancient Orient,
the specifically Christian aspect has to be clarified in comparison to preceding and
neighboring cultures.
2. Bible and Antiquity
In the early Oriental and ancient environments in which Christianity arose, no
other religions – except Judaism and ancient philosophy4 – had sophisticated
perspectives on war. There was no priesthood that might represent an in-
dependent point of view in any of these cultures (Babylon, Assur, Egypt et al.).
Temples were built by royal decree, and temple cults served the wellbeing of the
king and his military success. Priests and attendants of the cults declared the king
chosen by God and maintained close company with royalty through careful ritual
sacrifice and dream interpretation. These cults did not provide spiritual guidance,
ethic counseling or sermons; in general, they had no independent prophets. These
were appointees of the king, such as the priests of sacrifice, seers, and dream
interpreters. They all viewed the king as an executive of God!s will or as equal to
the gods, and supported him as such. They predicted victory and the downfall of
the enemy. They carried cultic images into battle. They celebrated success and
archived the cover-ups of losses.5Cult priests saw nomissionary intention in these
wars. The gods of other kingswere considered to exist, though viewed as obviously
less powerful. So they were integrated into their own polytheist pantheon under
their own chief god. Therefore, there were no "holy wars! intending to annihilate
inferior rituals. Wars were fought over resources: for expansion of lordship, for
servile subjects and tribute, for looting weapons and slaves, wood, oil, wine, or for
3 Holzem,Andreas: “Geistliche imKrieg und die Normen des Kriegsverstehens: Ein
religionsgeschichtliches Modell zu Ritual, Ethik und Trost zwischen militärischer Kult-
tradition und christlicher Friedenspflicht”, in: Brendle, Franz / Schindling, Anton (eds.):
Geistliche im Krieg, Münster 2009, 41–85.
4 Cf. Groß, Walter, “Keine "Heiligen Kriege! in Israel. Zur Rolle JHWH!s in
Kriegsdarstellungen der Bücher Jos bis 2Kön”, in: Holzem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und
Christentum: Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in
der Geschichte, Vol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 107–127. Erler, Michael, “Ursachena-
nalyse von Krieg und Frieden bei Platon und in der hellenistischen Philosophie”, in:
Holzem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum: Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der
Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte, Vol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009,
169–179.
5 Stietencron, Heinrich von: “Töten im Krieg: Grundlagen und Entwicklungen”, in:
Ders. (ed.): Töten im Krieg, Freiburg et al. 1995, 17–53; 34–41.
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passage to an ocean. This explains the general difference in the tendency of
Israel!s war tales: The flight from Egypt and the periods of settlement and the
Judges support an evaluation of the JHWH cult as having a militant, violence-
affirming, and violence-prone stance – in line with the adjacent cultures, but with
one substantial difference: the idea of the impurity of all other religions as a step
on Israel!s longway tomonotheism. These texts give a central role to divine action
in war: JHWH may bring the enemy within Israel!s reach and thus bring about
victory through hiswondrous intervention. In exchange, however, he demands the
complete annihilation of the enemy, not only of the warriors, but of all people,
animals and plunder to avoid contact with their contaminant ways of worship
(cf. 1 Sam 15; Dtn 20,1–20).
Thereafter, Israel underwent essential religious-historical development: In the
Hebrew bible as early as the late Kingdom period, a prophecy arose that was
critical of king and war, reaching a climax with Amos and Hosea. The exilic-post-
exilic (dtn-dtr) treatment of historical material as a deuteronomistic (dtr) inter-
pretation attempted to explain the fall of Israel and the Babylonian exile.
Therefore, the Hebrew bible drew on texts that were very critical of royalty, texts
that did not suppress narratives of war losses. Instead the bible has a tone that is
jealous ofGod!s concern for keeping the covenant between JHWHandhis chosen
people (Ex 19,3–6; Ex 24). Unlike the narratives of the early Oriental tradition,
the downfall was not provoked by God!s powerlessness, but by the people!s – and
particularly the ruler!s – consistent violation of the covenant minutes (cf. Hos 11–
14, Jes 9,7–20; 43,27–28).Many of the reports of Israel!s conquer of and settling in
Canaan, including the elimination of the local population (Num 21,3; Dtn 2,34;
Dtn 3,6; Dtn 7,2; Jos 2,10; Jos 6,17–21; Jos 10,1; Jos 10,28–43; Jos 11,1–23), are
nowadays interpreted as a retrospective construction by this deuteronomistic
school insisting on strictmonotheism. TheOldTestament thus attempts to explain
violent narratives of extrememilitary loss asGod!s punishment for the defiance of
religious commandments. The cult priests linked to the kings of Israel and the first
Jerusalem temple were history themselves, when this school of theologians began
to construe the religious interpretation of Israel!s war history.
Christianity!s relation to war was ambiguous from the start. It was initially a
religion far from the pillars of the Roman state. Jesus himself was denounced by
theRoman authorities for blasphemy and instigating uproar; and themissionaries
and founders of Christian communities were executed for repudiating Rome!s
religious traditions. The commandment to love thy neighbor (Mt 5,38–48 par), an
absolute basic concept of the earliest records of Jesus-tradition6, conflicted with
any aggressive interpretation of the relationship to God (cf. Lev 5). The Corpus
6 Luz, Ulrich: “Feindesliebe und Gewaltverzicht: Zur Struktur und Problematik
neutestamentlicher Friedensideen”, in: Holzem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum:
Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte,
Vol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 137–149; 137.
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Paulinum aligned itself with the ancient Christian reality as subject to a pagan
authority, but refused to participate in its polytheistic cults (Rom 13). The
apocalypse predicted massive battles of transcendent powers and the ex-
termination of God!s enemies in the End of Days brought about by God (Rev 18/
20), but these visions were written down not to justify force but to comfort and
strengthen helplessly marginalized Christian congregations.7 The interpretation
of Jesus! renunciation of violence all the way to the cross posed a challenge:
Originally, this was a subversive sign against the brutality of rulers. Only centuries
later, Christ!s suffering was to be seen as opening a special way of succession:
Believers taking part in a war were invited to imagine this threat to their life as a
sacrifice equal to Jesus!.
Therefore, the early Christians relation to war was double-edged: Firstly,
Christian theology in late antiquity took as its central theme not an interpretation
of war, but an ethic of peace. Christianity had to be interpreted as applicable to
issues of political and military responsibility. Lactantius, Ambrosius, and partic-
ularly Augustine did not rule out war completely, but laid out the first rational
criteria for its necessity8 : war must serve to overcome inaequitas (inequity) and
neglect of iustitia (justice) and lex aeterna (eternal law). Thus in actuality, they
developed the distinction between ius ad bellum (right towar) and ius in bello (law
in war) as well as characteristics of their implementation through ratio (reason)
and sapientia (wisdom). Augustine saw passion dominate reason in war; in the
Christian interpretation, this was a consequence of man!s fall into sin, and of the
destruction this incidence left in creation and in humankind!s mind. Following
pre-Christian philosophy, Augustine contended that the desire to rule (libido
dominandi) and the desire to harm others (libido ulciscendi) were weaknesses in
the inner unity of the human being. Because a truly Christian order of society –
ruled by iustitia, caritas and clementia – was assessed as impossible after the fall
into sin, state penal powers had to keep judicial order. The “righteous war” was
limited to an outpouring of state efforts to establish order, and Augustine did not
dispute that most wars of the Roman Empire would thus be considered unjust. At
the same time, Augustine argued that the Donatists of North Africa, whose
suppression he claimed, should be persecuted not because of their differing be-
liefs, but because of their tendency towards violence against the community and
against the true religion. To oblige them to attend the services of the true church
(compelle intrare, cf. Lk 14,23) would, he assumed, reconvert them to the right-
eous doctrine and peaceful behavior. The “doctrine of peace” that can be read
7 Nicklas, Tobias: “Der Krieg und die Apokalypse: Gedanken zu Offb 19,11–21”, in:
Holzem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum: Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der
Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte, Vol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009,
150–165; 150.
8 Cf. Weissenberg, Timo J.: Die Friedenslehre des Augustinus: Theologische
Grundlagen und ethische Entfaltung, Stuttgart 2005.
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from Augustine!s texts saw no role for priests in battle, because war was close to
incompatible with divinity. The principle pacem pace non bello (peace through
peace and not through war) is the truemaxim ofAugustine!s ethics of peace.9This
meant that an intervention in war by clerics was essentially unthinkable.
During the Middle Ages, however, the perspective of reading Augustine had
shifted: In their eyes, the church father!s interpretation of the Roman emperor!s
targets shed light on their own self-understanding of being aChristianwarrior like
Constantine. This emphasis on war instead of peace was intensified by the Old
Testament!s role model of being a king under God!s eyes: The biblical texts were
largely interpreted as historically true reports about virtuous rulers. The strong
beliefs of military leaders and kings held sway alongside a belief in the assistance
of JHWH in victory. Thus Augustine had laid the parameters for later justifica-
tions of wars against “idolaters” and “heretics”. Declaring the emperor and the
European kings as pious rulers in the service ofGod, violence became explainable
as the will of God particularly against the Catharists and Muslims. Augustine!s
few, restrictive concessions to the option of “just” war were later expanded to the
basis of a systematic war ethic. This remained valid in moral theological hand-
books into the 20th century. The questions were therefore: How does war fit into
Christian life, how can it be reconciled with the will of God, how can Christian
societies come to termswith themanifold ideas ofGod!s actions in history and the
human sufferings in their aftermath, and what clerical aid – by either motivation
or consolation – is acceptable in the effort to construe a meaning of death as well
as survival? But it was seldom asked how holding Christian beliefs should limit
war. This is the first side: the bible, ancient Christian theology and war, including
the tendencies of its further developments.
On the other hand, despite this ambivalence in their holy scriptures and in the
ethics of war, during the late antiquity, Christians integrated themselves surpris-
ingly smoothly into the Roman army. The bible reports the earliest Christian
military service. Since state and earthly order must be provisionally accepted,
even soldiers were allowed in Christian religious communities (cf. Mk 5 par; Mt 8
par; Lk 3; Acts 10). They were probably able to avoid participation in pagan
rituals except in phases of persecution of Christians directed by the regional or
central governments of the Roman Empire.10
With Constantine!s victory at the Milvian Bridge, the Christian God was en-
gaged for the first time to aid in battle. The reasoning behind this event was from
the pagan cult-theory of “the stronger god.” Clerics were not present at the battle
9 Cf. Weissenberg, Friedenslehre, 176–177.
10 Cf. Brennecke,HannsChristoph, “Kriegsdienst und Soldatenberuf für Christen und
die Rolle des römischen Heeres für die Mission”, in: Holzem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und
Christentum: Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in
der Geschichte, Vol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 180–211.
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according to the report by Eusebius of Caesarea.11 They came into play only later
in order to enable interpretation of this war in the classical scheme of divine aid.
Thus a far-reaching model appeared: To prevent archaic violence in human
communities ripe with conflict, a Christian variant of the “legitimation to kill as a
specific correlate of power”12 was thought to be necessary. After 312 CE, Con-
stantine went beyond placing the Christianmonogram he had seen in the vision at
the Milvian Bridge on the shields of his warriors, on his military standard (laba-
rum), and on his helmet. Towards the end of his reign, Christian priests were
present in imperial armies. The first weapon blessings with this XR-symbol were
added, and camps included prayer tents, bishops, and military chaplains. The
religious needs of the Roman army transferred from paganism to an oath of
allegiance to the trinity, Christian laws, prayers, crosses, icons, and liturgies
stepped into the army as well as a Christianized imperial cult, all without much
modification of the pagan concepts of understanding the role of religion in war-
times. Indirectly, emperors continued the Roman tradition established in the
Republican Period: Decisions about war outcomes were laid into the hands of the
gods. In pre-Christian periods, bellum iustum (just war) depended especially on
influencing the Gods with a ritually correct cult. This ancient theory of bellum
iustum had nothing to do with ethical categories of justice. Christian clerics
adopted this concept, amalgamating it with the completely different approach of
the patristic theologians: So they did what pagan priests had done for the army
before them to emphasize the army!s dependence on divine powers. Additionally,
Christianity!s rich reservoir of rituals could also deliver imperial style in war.13
In order to gain a balanced perspective of early Christian developments, the
religious-political contrast between the theologian!s restrictive war ethic and a
parallel, seemingly unproblematic transfer of pre-Christian military cults should
be noted. The Christianization of army and war since late antiquity provided
clerics with two positions representing two sets of demands that were difficult to
reconcile and that had systems of rules based on differing responsible parties: on
the one side were theologians and biblical hermeneutics and on the other side
were prayers of invocation and “sacrifice”. Christianity was therefore always as
free as it was forced to consider its options between these poles and to provide
political advice based on such considerations. Its representatives also had to both
adhere to and want to provide such spiritual weapons which had descended from
11 Cf. Eusebius of Caesarea:Vita Constantini 1,29; in: De Vita Constantini, ed. Bruno
Bleckmann / Horst Schneider (Fontes Christiani 83), Turnhout 2007, 184–197.
12 Stietencron, Töten, 34–35.
13 Meier,Mischa: “Der christliche Kaiser zieht (nicht) in den Krieg: "Religionskriege!
in der Spätantike?”, in: Holzem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum: Religiöse Ge-
walttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte, Vol. 50),
Paderborn et al. 2009, 254–278; 260.
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political religions of the ancientOrient and the pre-ChristianMediterranean. This
in turn created a multitude of ambiguities and ethical problems.
3. The Middle Ages
In theMiddleAges, the Christian justification for war based onAugustine!s peace
theory – given the unsurpassed authority of this church father – held ground
substantially, but was adjusted to the new realities of war: Neither the Caro-
lingians nor the Ottonians declared to wage “holy” missionary wars to violently
expand Christianity among Saxons and Slavs. The prevailing connection between
war and mission was based on a pattern of justification that interpreted political
unpredictability and barbarian savagery as pagan religious trademarks. The
Christianization could thus appear as a means for political civilizing.14
During the High Middle Ages, especially the Treuga Dei (Peace and Truce of
God) was no blessing upon war actions, but a campaign to pacify western Chris-
tianity ad extra (against the expansion of Islam) and ad intra (against the per-
manent aristocratic feuds destroying lands and churches). Of course, all these
wars were based on the idea that taking up the Christian faith was essential for the
consolidation of a violence-free space and that Christian rulers and Church rep-
resentatives had the task of protection and jurisdiction in carrying out this idea.
Therefore, the theory emerged that war could be engaged in by order of the
Church and with the Church!s authority. This sort of war should be salutary for
participants, under the precondition of the warrior!s right intention: to reinstate
peace, to protect the church, to avoid unjust iniquities and eliminate any avarice
and hate out of his heart. This was pure Augustinism. Due to the emperor – and
every ruler in general – being appointed to protect not only secular order, but also
the Church and the true faith, the substantially defensive basis of ethical re-
flections on war in Christian theology could be converted into an offensive
strategy in these contexts. Securing the Treuga Dei, the fight for Church reform,
the crusades against the harassment of Christian pilgrims in the Muslim world, as
well as the support of heretics, gained curative qualities for the salvation of the
Christian knighthood, in terms of a theology of repentance and redemption.
Nevertheless, the sources for the crusades use the term bellum sacrum/sanctum as
little as the collections of canonic law and moral theology through to Thomas
Aquinas. Furthermore, the crusades were justified as a war for the “defense of
Christianity against the threat of Muslim powers and in order to regain formerly
14 Körntgen, Ludger: “Heidenkrieg und Bistumsgründung: Glaubensverbreitung als
Herrscheraufgabe bei Karolingern und Ottonen”, in: Holzem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und
Christentum: Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in
der Geschichte, Vol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 281–304; 281.
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Christian areas”.15 In this sense, the indulgence promulgated by pope Urban II as
a part of the crusades propaganda was not a collective romanticization of war
waging knights as martyrs – although the crusaders mostly saw themselves as
such – but the indulgencies were understood as individual commutations of
penance. The beneficial value of participation should be preconditioned as long as
the campaign succeeded as “solely devotional (pro sola devotione).”
On the other hand, participants in crusades created their own religious logic,
which was difficult to reconcile with reflections from Augustine through Gratian
to ThomasAquinas. Among crusaders and then among people including the pope
who celebrated their victory in 1099 a belief in the pollutio (pollution) of holy sites
by the Muslim conquerors was at work, for which an atoning purification was
achieved through the bloodshed of the supposed offenders: The massacre of the
inhabitants of Jerusalem in 1099 was sanctified as the violent wrath of God
himself. The crusaders believed that the holy sites had to be expurgated from the
stain of Muslim cultic practices. Texts of the Hebrew bible – as those analyzed
above – that were originally applied to themes of blaming Israel, infidelity against
the covenant and divine fate were now considered analogous paradigms of vio-
lence in the name of God. Between theological questions of justice and cultic
blood vengeance, a kind of “negative compromise” had emerged.16
In wars taking place in the West against alleged enemies of the true faith,
particularly in the Albigensian War against heretics in Southern France, these
theories gained their own history of reception. The Christian faith, according to
the indisputable consensus, could not be violently propagated and had to be
accepted freely. But as is often commonplace, to circumvent this basic theological
assumption people, once baptized and Christianized, could sometimes even be
forced (corporaliter compellere) to comply to the assumed faith and stick to its
ethical obligations and liturgical practices. Here Augustine!s position towards the
Donatist Schism provided authority even in wars against heretics. The Albi-
gensian crusade was completely ineffective in the search for Cathar perfecti
(apostles) and credenti (supporters) or in coping with the widespread religious
syncretism. Instead, the war was preceded by another declared goal: Allegedly
illegitimate rulers who did not fight the heresy were to be replaced with principes
catholici (princes loyal to the Catholic Church). The condemnation of enemies of
the faith as peace breakers and the kings! responsibility to protect the church to
15 Hehl, Ernst Dieter: “Heiliger Krieg – Eine Schimäre? Überlegungen zur Kano-
nistik und Politik des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts”, in: Holzem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und
Christentum: Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in
der Geschichte, Vol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 323–340; 325.
16 Angenendt, Arnold: “Die Kreuzzüge: Aufruf zum "gerechten! oder zum "heiligen!
Krieg?”, in: Holzem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum: Religiöse Gewalttheorien
in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte, Vol. 50), Paderborn et al.
2009, 341–367, 361.
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evade God!s wrath derived essentially from the concept of a Christian empire in
late antiquity and of a faithful kingship in the Carolingian and Ottonian periods;
theTreugaDeiwas intended to bind the local noblemen in honor and assigned the
leadership for the whole process to the church authorities: the pope and his
legates. Hence, the spectrum of just reasons for war was – according to the sit-
uation in south-west France during the 12th and 13th centuries – expanded again to
include “the replacement of local and territorial rulers who condoned hereticism
withCatholic aristocrats.”17Nonetheless, froma legal and theological perspective,
this was not an escalation to a sanctified "divine war!, it was a well expected
opportunity to integrate the hitherto independent south into the realm of the
French kingdom. Being declared as a campaign to defend the church, it was
covered with papal indulgencies as the crusades to Jerusalem or the Reconquista
in Spain.
The history of medieval war theory accounts argumentatively for a process of a
permanent re-interpretation of "just war!-ideas; "holy war! was not at all a central
term in these debates, it would occur later and under different preconditions. In
fact, the specifically religious reasons for "just war! steadily expanded up to the
severe and heated debates in 15th and 16th centuries Spain on the inhuman colo-
nization and Christianization of the so called "New Indies! in Latin America.
Erasmus of Rotterdam was the first to criticize war as destruction of the divine
order of creation and damage to state, society, and economy in his early humanist
text Dulce bellum inepertis18, but in the face of confessional conflict erupting in
Imperial Germany and the Turkish threat in the Southeast, even Erasmus con-
sidered it necessary to relativize the ethical primacy of a total Christian pacifism.
4. The Early Modern Period
The confessional conflicts that dominated the early modern period constituted a
multi-layered challenge for the Christian formation of war theory. Even more
than the Middle Ages, the confessional wars of Europe!s early modern period
were assessed to be the parade ground for bloodthirsty fanaticized religion, since
the European enlightenment movements began to criticize confessional ortho-
doxies of all sorts. The discreteness of the political sphere, the emancipation from
17 Oberste, Jörg: “Krieg gegen Ketzer? Die defensores, receptatores und fautores von
Ketzern und die principes catholici in der kirchlichen Rechtfertigung des Albi-
genserkriegs”, in: Holzem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum: Religiöse Ge-
walttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte, Vol. 50),
Paderborn et al. 2009, 368–391; 386.
18 Cf. Erasmus von Rotterdam: “Dulce bellum inexpertis”, in: Adagia (Nr. 3001).
Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami. Recognita et adnotatione critica instructa
notisque illustratae, Bd. 2,7, Amsterdam / Heidelberg 1999, 11–44.
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religious authorities and the claim to control and domesticate fanaticism and
extremism; all of these elements considered typical for modern Western self-
understanding can be considered as consequences drawn from war experiences
during the era of confessionalism.
Christian theory development, which was authoritative for political decisions,
interpretive models and war experiences of protagonists in the 16th and 17th
centuries, was once again in noway a unilineal processmatching these subsequent
apodictic judgments. Martin Luther!s Two Kingdoms resp. Two Governments
Doctrine, a part of which is applicable for military interpretation, was a first
attempt to subtly differentiate areas of worldly law and agency from areas within
which God related to human beings. This doctrine must be understood as an
enhancement frommedieval political theory and not as a reversal thereof. In one
decisive respect a boundary is set for any secular authority: It has no authorization
to intervene in the interpretation of the Gospel, although Luther had to concede
that the shaping of new protestant church orders could not be established without
extensive influence of the civil authorities. In another respect, Luther assessed the
(hitherto papal and episcopal) influence as an abuse of clerical power in the
political order of the German princes! realms. Thus he opened a political playing
field, wherein proclamations of ecclesiastical power were no longer legitimate.
The terrena civitas, Luther was convinced, is not to be ruled by the Gospel: Here
the secular authority has autonomous penal power to repel the devil!s efforts to
destroy the societal order of Christianity.
As important as the Two Kingdoms Doctrine was for any theory of the state in
early modernity, it also had a blind side. In the case of the German Peasants!War,
war theory in the Lutheran formulation lost its affiliation to practical moral
philosophy and moral theology, which it had held since late antiquity and
throughout thewhole of theMiddleAges, andwhich it wouldmaintain inCatholic
Baroque Scholasticism in the early modern period. The political autonomy of
secular authorities could hardly be countered, since for Luther “the deciding
themewas not the formof authority, but the necessity for control of human evil”.19
The Two Kingdom Doctrine thus supported, but did not control, the military
aspect of nation building.
The debate developed differently in the reformed nations of Switzerland and
England. TheReformation inZurich andGenevawanted to shape theworld using
the norms of the Gospel. “What differentiates the Zwinglian and Calvinist
Churches [is] the claim that the Kingdom of Christ is etiam externum”.20 In ac-
19 Leppin, Volker: “Das Gewaltmonopol der Obrigkeit: Luthers sogenannte Zwei-
Reiche-Lehre und der Kampf zwischen Gott und Teufel”, in: Holzem, Andreas (ed.):
Krieg und Christentum: Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens
(Krieg in der Geschichte, Vol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 403–414; 411.
20 Schmidt, Heinrich Richard: “Religion und Krieg im Reformiertentum”, in: Hol-
zem, Andreas (ed.): Krieg und Christentum: Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegs-
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cordance with the covenant theology from the Old Testament, authority had to
actively secure the true faith and help expand theKingdomofChrist on earth. The
justification for this lay not in the conventional responsibility of Church pro-
tection as debated in the Middle Ages, but in the reception of deuteronomistic
historical theology: A ruler and their people who injure the conditions of the
covenant will be punished by God in heaven with defeat in war, exile and ban-
ishment from world history. In this context, the concept of “holy war” appeared
for the first time in reformed war theology. It justified a truly Christian people!s
right to disobedience and civil war against tyrannical rulers. The persecution of
the reformed faith – for example in the Habsburg Netherlands or in France – was
interpreted as the most specific form of unjustified violence.
On the other hand, in “patriarchalGerman principalities integrated in the state
order of the Holy Roman Empire”21, the phenomenon of dissimulation of reli-
gious war and religious justification for violence was prevalent in both large
confessions. The wars that had occurred in the Empire because of differences of
faithwere explained by the emperor as the execution of the order of "Landfrieden!
(public peace), broken by the protestant princes, and vice versa by those princes as
legal defense of their constitutionally guaranteed freedom against imperial ab-
solutism in questions of conscience. To take the long view, the dissimulation of
religious war proved to be a motor of juridification (Verrechtlichung) of politics
and military independently of questions of religious truth. An essential con-
sequence of German peace and constitutional orders after 1648 was the exclusion
of religion from the concept of just war. The conflict between increasing multi-
nationalism in the European system of power and the old universal concepts of
Christianitas (Christianity), Imperium (Empire), or Monarchia universalis (uni-
versal monarchy) played as much of a role as the internal establishment of states
that were undertaken as an emancipatory dissolution of greater, cross-national
alliances. In this process, the state tried to take control over religion, while the
bearers of religion continued to argue the supremacy of religious arguments for
rulers! political decision-making.
It was decisive for the development of the relationship between Christianity
and war in the early modern period that the observation that theoretical organ-
ization and moral evaluations of war did not break down only along confessional
lines, but also according to the place of debate in society. After the peace treaty of
Augsburg 1555, the Emperors and the Imperial princes no longer mobilized the
medieval right of defeating heresy as a war theory. But this differed from the
erfahrung desWestens (Krieg in derGeschichte,Vol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 415–438;
415.
21 Brendle, Franz: “Der Religionskrieg und seine Dissimulation. Die "Verteidigung
des wahren Glaubens! im Reich des konfessionellen Zeitalters”, in: Holzem, Andreas
(ed.): Krieg und Christentum: Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des
Westens (Krieg in der Geschichte, Vol. 50), Paderborn et al. 2009, 457–469; 457.
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assessments made in many academic faculties of theology on both sides, in the
religious orders, and in the majority of public opinion that developed powerfully
after the Reformation: Here, the religious war was a reality up until 1648, ex-
pected and feared, publicly fought and suffered.22 The juridification and nation-
alization of war disregarded this during the early modern period, drawing instead
on post-confessional theories of state, on debates of natural rights, and on the
Enlightenment.
5. A Sketch of Christian War Theories in the Wake of Modern
War Ideologies
During the Cabinet Wars of the 18th century, the military was increasingly na-
tionalized. In the process, rulers! authority for interpreting and organizing also the
religious aspects of war grew steadily. Any religious service in the armies un-
derwent strict control by military regimes and their focused aim: motivating men
to fight and die.
On the other hand, after 1789 this nationalization of war was overrun with
radicalizing forms of political awareness: concepts and myths about “the people”
and “the nation”. These new ideologies had the greatest influence during thewars
triggered by the French revolution and its combatants, and afterwards the Na-
poleonic wars. The nation in itself was esteemed as a secularized "holiness! ; pa-
triotism provoked new forms of quasi-religious enthusiasm. Those motives of
Christian war ethics that fenced off and limited war were as lost as its secular
remainders in public international law, established after 1648. Instead, a process
of anti-secularization set in, encouraging the peoples and nations to establish an
overwhelming political transcendence for which new forms of cult were created.
For the relationship between war and Christianity in European modernity, these
political-ideological sacralizations of peoples, nations and sometimes the revo-
lution itself brought about ambivalent consequences. Starting with the revolu-
tionary wars, but throughout the whole of the 19th and 20th centuries, Christianity
was forced to confront and meanwhile integrate this new sacralization of politics.
War gained something "holy! precisely in this context of a quasi-religious, political
transcendence.23 Everywhere, modern Christianity had to comment on political
22 Cf. Holzem, Andreas: “Gott und Gewalt. Kriegslehren des Christentums und die
Typologie des "Religionskrieges!”, in: Beyrau, Dietrich / Hochgeschwender, Michael /
Langewiesche, Dieter (eds.), Formen des Krieges. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart
(Krieg in der Geschichte, Bd. 37), Paderborn et al. 2007, 371–413.
23 Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm: “Sakralisierung von Kriegen: Begriffs- und problem-
geschichtliche Erwägungen”, in: Schreiner, Klaus (ed.): Heilige Kriege. Religiöse Be-
gründungen militärischer Gewaltanwendung: Judentum, Christentum und Islam im
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religiosity as it grewmore andmore dominant as a source ofmeaning.Bishops and
theologians could not avoid supporting this evolution of enthusiastic ideologies
with Christian explanations. Meanwhile, they adhered to alternative traditions
that interpreted war as a calamity of God!s punishment, as a call to penance for
individual and collective sins and as a catharsis of modern, post-revolutionary
societies to purify their liberal, disbelieving culture. The Churches regarded
modern war as a missionary field, because war stirred the routines of irreligious
lifestyles up and irritated religious neglect with the threat of an untimely death of
masses. In short: War offered an opportunity to speak about collective respon-
sibility and individual con- or reversion. The individual “sacrifice” of every sol-
dier!s life was considered part of atonement for a collective sin, identified with the
spiritual shortcomings of modern society. The leading voice did not critically
question war, but spoke of readiness to make oblations.
In the greater European and American denominations, none of these con-
ventional war theories as they were applied to the situation of modern mass wars
survived May 8, 1945. Certainly, the consequences of this long debate about war
and Christianity should not be overlooked: Christian war ethics required justifi-
cation for both ius ad bellum and ius in bello and condemned excessive violence
both generally and in individual cases. Christianity has held fast to the basic idea
that war is not an elevated form of existence, but one of the most horrific con-
sequences of sin. Conversely, it may hardly be claimed that the increasing secu-
larization of the political world has considerably fostered peace. The secular law
of nations rests, rather, in its essential basis on the fruits ofChristian thought about
war ethics.
Only after the Second World War, under the banner of the Cold War, the
atomic arms race and the international proxywars inKorea, Vietnam, andAfrica,
a broad debate began in Europe andNorthAmerica about the prospects of peace
in international political institutions andprocesses. Parallel to this, the first serious
and numerically important Christian peace movements were established. Since
then, the question of Christian war theory has been posed completely differently;
these debates take leave of the old concepts, mentalities and rituals. Instead, they
emphasize an alternative idea of God!s partiality: God can no longer be imagined
as partial to this or that warring party who claim "just! reasons for their own
campaign. Recently challenged anew by the problem of military crisis inter-
ventions in collapsing states, in genocides and against Islamist terror groups,
Christianity in the 21st century has had to reflect the basic idea that God cannot
remain neutral in the face of mass killings and hardship deaths. The vast majority
of Christians today formulate God!s partiality differently; they postulate God!s
engagement as for humane life for all people, following the focus of contemporary
Bible reception. Out of this, the fundamental question arises of how such a
Vergleich (Schriften desHistorischen Kollegs. Kolloquien, Bd. 78),München 2008, 1–30;
7.
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theologically basic option may be formulated and transferred into political
processes so that the Augustine pacificus esse (peaceful existence) of Christianity
may gain new credibility.
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